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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Eugene L. Perry, as personal representative of the 
Estate of Diane Laura McLaughlin, petitioned the Third Judicial 
District Probate Court for an order vacating the court's 
earlier December 3, 1985 Order on the ground that it was void 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Was the court's 
refusal to grant this petition reversible error where: 
A. Mr. Perry petitioned the probate court 
in October 1985 for an order approving the 
sale of estate property to Albert and Susan 
Arnaud; 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3), which 
previously provided that, when a personal 
representative petitioned the court for the 
approval of the sale of estate property, 
"any person may appear and bid for the 
property," was repealed in 1983; 
C. Kent and Carol McLaughlin appeared and 
bid on the home and furnishings at the 
November 6, 19 8 5 hearing; 
D. Neither Kent nor Carol McLaughlin is an 
"interested person" as that term is defined 
by Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(20) (1978); 
E. The probate court ordered Mr. Perry to 
sell the home and furnishings to the 
McLaughlins (The December 3, 1985 Order); 
F. The Utah Supreme Court has held that a 
party must have standing as an "interested 
person" to intervene in a probate court 
proceeding; 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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G. Utah law provides that a probate 
court's authority is statutory and that an 
order entered without statutory authority is 
void and should be vacated; 
H. Federal decisions uniformly hold that 
it is reversible error for a federal court 
to refuse to vacate an order under F.R.CP. 
Rule 60(b)(4) if the order is void; and 
I. F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) is identical to 
U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5)?
 : 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
The Death of Diane McLaughlin and her Survivors 
Diane Laura McLaughlin ("Diane") died on August 2, 
1985 as a result of the crash of Delta Air Lines Flight 191 at 
Dallas/Fort Worth Airport. (R.24). She was survived by her two 
sons, Shaun and Dustin McLaughlin ("Shaun" and "Dustin") and 
her father, Eugene L. Perry ("Mr. Perry"). (R.7, 238). Diane 
was the legal custodian of Shaun and Dustin at the time of her 
death. (R.41). 
Diane was also survived by her former husband, Kent 
McLaughlin, the father of Shaun and Dustin. (R.40-41). After 
his divorce from Diane, Mr. McLaughlin had remarried. His 
wife's name is Carol McLaughlin. (R.168). 
- 2 -
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The Appointment of a Conservator for Shaun and Dustin 
And a Personal Representative for Diane's Estate 
After Diane's death, her father, Mr. Perry, petitioned 
the Third Judicial District Probate Court for an order 
appointing Commercial Security Bank conservator for Shaun and 
Dustin. The probate court granted that petition on September 
4, 1985, in Probate No. P-85-837. 
After its appointment, Commercial Security Bank 
nominated Mr.Perry to act as personal representative of the 
Estate of Diane Laura McLaughlin. (R.5). The probate court 
granted Mr. Perry's petition for appointment as personal 
representative of Diane's intestate estate on September 25, 
1985, in Probate No. P-85-893. (R.13-15). 
Mr. Perry Acts to Sell Diane's Home 
Other than a wrongful death claim against Delta Air 
Lines and others, the single most valuable asset in Diane's 
estate was her home and her personal property located in the 
home. (R.39). After his appointment, Mr. Perry listed the home 
for sale with a real estate agent. (R.376). 
- 3 -
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Kent McLaughlin's Offer to Waive his Equitable 
Interest in Diane's Home 
Shortly after Diane's death, Kent McLaughlin told Mr. 
Perry that Mr. McLaughlin was willing to waive his equitable 
lien against Diane's home (approximating $2,500.00). (R.41). 
Mr. McLaughlin obtained the equitable lien as part of the 
decree of divorce from Diane. (R.40). The amount of the lien 
had been reduced pursuant to a written agreement between Mr. 
McLaughlin and Diane in January 1984. (R.40, 50-53). 
Mr. Perry Petitions the Court for Approval 
of the Sale of the Home to the Arnauds 
In October, 1985, Albert and Susan Arnaud presented an 
offer to purchase Diane's home and certain furnishings located 
in the home. (R.46-49, 54). Mr. Perry determined that the 
offer was reasonable. (R.38-44). However, Mr. McLaughlin's 
oral waiver of his equitable lien was not of record. As a 
result, Mr. Perry could not pass clear title without court 
approval of the oral waiver. Thus, Mr. Perry accepted the 
Arnaud's offer subject to probate court approval. (R.47). 
- 4 -
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On October 15, 1985, Mr. Perry filed a petition for 
approval of the sale of the home and the furnishings to the 
Arnauds and for the approval of Mr. McLaughlin's oral waiver of 
his lien. (R.38-54). However, prior to the hearing Mr. 
McLaughlin filed a written objection to Mr. Perry's petition, 
withdrawing his oral waiver. (R.55-56). 
At the hearing, the Court Opened the Proceedings 
For Bids on Diane's Home and Furnishings 
The probate court heard Mr. Perry's petition on 
November 6, 1985, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. 
(R.62). E. H. Fankhauser appeared at the hearing as attorney 
for Kent and Carol McLaughlin. (R.62) When the matter was 
called, the court, mistakenly acting pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-710(3) (repealed 1983), asked for higher and better bids 
with regard to the home and the furnishings located within the 
home. (R.77-78). The McLaughlins moved the court to order Mr. 
Perry to sell the home and furnishings to them at the price 
they offered. (R.77-78). The court determined that Kent and 
Carol McLaughlin's offer for the home and the furnishings was a 
better offer and ordered the home and the furnishings sold to 
- 5 -
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the McLaughlins. (R.369-386). While Mr. Perry objected to the 
court's actions on other grounds, he did not object to the 
granting of the petition on the basis that Subsection 
75-3-710(3) had been repealed. (R.369-386). Counsel for Mr. 
Perry was not aware of the repeal at the hearing. (R.241). 
The December 3, 1985 Order Required the McLaughlins 
To Purchase the Home and Furnishings on or before 
December 1, 1985 
The court entered its written order on December 3, 
1985. (R.77-81). Counsel for Mr. Perry participated in the 
drafting of the order. (R.66-81). The December 3, 1985 Order 
required the McLaughlins to purchase the home and furnishings 
on or before December 1, 1985. (R.80). The McLaughlins 
tendered a check for the furnishings prior to December 1, 1985. 
(R.267). However, the McLaughlins were unable to close on the 
home. (R.187, 265-266). On the advice of counsel, Mr. Perry 
took the position that the court's order required the 
McLaughlins to purchase both the home and the furnishings as a 
package. (R.208, 233). When the McLaughlins were unable to 
close on the home, pursuant to the advice of counsel, Mr. Perry 
sold the home and the furnishings to Albert and Susan Arnaud on 
December 13, 1985. (R.208, 232). 
- 6 -
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The McLaughlins Obtain an Order to Show Cause 
Thereafter, on December 27, 1985, the McLaughlins obtained 
ex parte an order to show cause why the personal representative 
should not be reguired to deliver the furnishings to Kent and 
Carol McLaughlin, (R.122-123, 126-127). The McLaughlins 
scheduled a hearing on their Order to Show Cause for January 
15, 1986 before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. (R.126). Judge 
Hanson was reassigned from the Third District's probate 
calendar as of January 1, 1986 and Judge Rigtrup replaced him. 
(R.126). 
Mr. Perry 
December 
Seeks 
3, 
Refuses 
to Amend 
1985 Order; 
to Hear his 
or Vacate the 
Judge Rigtrup 
Petition 
Prior to the hearing date, Mr. Perry filed a petition 
with the probate court requesting that the court amend the 
December 3, 1985 Order pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure (1983). (R.100-103). At the hearing on 
January 15, 1986, Judge Rigtrup advised Mr. Perry that he would 
not hear the Rule 60(b) petition because the order it sought to 
- 7 -
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amend or vacate was entered by another district court judge. 
(R.241). As a result, Mr. Perry requested a continuance in 
order to attempt to consolidate before Judge Hanson his Rule 
60(b) petition with the McLaughlins' order to show cause. 
(R.241, 109-114). Judge Rigtrup granted Mr. Perry's request 
for a continuance but entered an unsigned minute entry in which 
he stated that the December 3, 1985 Order entitled the 
McLaughlins to the furnishings and that the furnishings should 
be delivered to Kent and Carol McLaughlin. (R.131-132). 
The Amended Petition to Amend or Vacate the 
December 3, 1985 Order; the Court Hears the Petition 
On January 20, 1986, Mr. Perry filed an amended petition 
for a Rule 60(b) order and noticed the petition to be heard 
before Judge Hanson. (R.179-184). On the day of the hearing, 
E. H. Fankhauser, counsel for the McLaughlins, filed his own 
affidavit with the court in which he made various allegations 
of misfeasance on the part of Mr. Perry and his counsel. 
(R.168-175). 
The matter was argued to the court on February 10, 
1986. (R.154). At the hearing, Mr. Perry moved to strike the 
- 8 -
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affidavit from Mr. Fankhauser on the basis that, among other 
reasons, it was untimely under the Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R.154). Mr. Perry also moved the court to certify under Rule 
54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983) the order 
entered as a final order in the event the court did not amend 
or vacate the December 3, 1985 Order. (R.165-166). The court 
denied the petition in so far as it sought to amend the 
December 3, 1985 Order, but it reserved judgment on all other 
matters (including the prayer that the order be vacated as 
void) and took those matters under advisement. (R.154). On 
February 25, 1986, Judge Hanson entered his Memorandum 
Decision. (R.156-167). 
The Court's Memorandum Decision Denies Mr. Perry's 
Petition 
In the Memorandum Decision, Judge Hanson ruled that, 
notwithstanding the repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3) in 1983, 
the court had general authority under the probate code to 
follow the procedure which had been followed at the November 6, 
1985 hearing. (R.163). Therefore, Judge Hanson ruled the 
December 3, 1985 Order was not void because of the repeal of 
- 9 -
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Subsection 75-3-710(3). (R.165). He further weighed the 
equities between the parties based only on the allegations 
contained in Mr. Fankhauser's affidavit and decided that Mr. 
Perry was not entitled to equitable relief under Rule 60(b). 
(Re 164-165). Based on the Memorandum Decision, the court 
entered a written order on March 12, 1986 denying Mr. Perry's 
Rule 60(b) Petition. (R.190-192). The court also denied Mr. 
Perry's oral motion to certify the order under Rule 54(b). 
(R.191). 
Mr. Perry Petitions the Court to Amend its Order 
and Certify the Order under Rule 54(b) 
On March 24, 1986, Mr. Perry filed a petition under 
Rule 59(a) asking the court to amend its March 12, 1986 Order 
as a manifest error of law. (R.200-204). In addition, Mr. 
Perry again asked the court to strike Mr. Fankhauser's 
affidavit and filed counter affidavits disputing his 
allegations. (R.193-194, 229-247). The two principal points 
raised in the Rule 59(a) petition were first, Kent and Carol 
McLaughlin were not "interested persons", and as such did not 
have standing to move the court for an order at the November 6, 
1985 hearing. (R.201). Second, Mr. Perry asked the court to 
certify the Order under Rule 54(b). (R.202). The court heard 
- 10 -
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Mr. Perry's petition on April 7. (R.251). The court agreed to 
certify the March 12th order under Rule 54(b). (R.251). 
However, the court otherwise confirmed the original order. 
(R.251). The court entered the amending order on July 9, 1986. 
(R.293-294). Mr. Perry now appeals the March 12th Order, as 
amended. (R.298-299). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The probate court entered its December 3, 1985 Order 
pursuant to the motion of persons who are not "interested 
persons" under the Utah Uniform Probate Code. When it did so, 
the probate court exceeded its subject matter jurisdictional 
authority. An order outside the jurisdictional authority of 
the probate court is void and should be vacated. When the 
probate court refused to vacate the December 3, 1985 Order 
pursuant to Mr. Perry's Rule 60(b)(5) motion, the probate court 
! committed reversible error. Thus, the Court should reverse the 
H 
i < 
|j probate court's decision and remand the case to the probate 
court with directions to enter an order vacating the December 
3, 1985 Order. 
- 11 -
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Ordinarily, in order to reverse a district court 
judge's decision made pursuant to a Rule 60(b) motion, the 
appellant must show that the judge abused his discretion. Laub 
v. South Central Utah Telephone Association, 657 P.2d 1304, 
1306 (Utah 1982). However, the federal courts have 
consistently held that a trial judge's refusal to vacate a void 
order pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion under the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure (1985) is reversible error. There is 
no need to show an abuse of discretion: 
There is no question of discretion on the part of the 
court when a motion is [made] under Rule 60(b)(4) [of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure].... Either a 
judgment is void or it is valid. Determining which it 
is may well present a difficult question, but when 
that question is resolved, the court must act 
accordingly. 
C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 2862 
(1973) (emphasis added). Rule 60(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (1985) is identical to Rule 60(b)(5) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983). Accordingly, if Mr. 
Perry can show that the order of December 3, 1985 was void, the 
Court should reverse the March 12, 1986 Order and direct Judge 
Hanson to enter an order vacating his December 3, 1985 Order. 
- 12 -
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a 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROBATE COURT EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTIONAL 
| AUTHORITY BY GRANTING AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF TO KENT AND CAROL 
I MCLAUGHLIN; NEITHER KENT NOR CAROL MCLAUGHLIN HAD STANDING TO 
|| MOVE THE PROBATE COURT FOR AFFIRMATIVE RELIEF AT THE NOVEMBER 
|| 6, 1985 HEARING, 
A. The Utah Uniform Probate Code Requires that a Person 
jj have Standing as an "Interested Person" in order to Participate 
jJ in Probate Proceedings. 
j It is axiomatic under Utah law that "a party must 
Ji demonstrate standing to raise an issue in order to secure a 
j ruling thereon." Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake City Commission, 624 
i 1 
j P.2d 1138, 1145 (Utah 1981); accord, Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 
j| 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). The Utah Uniform Probate Code codified 
j] this principle. Subsection 75-3-105(1) limits those who may 
j| 
]] seek formal orders to "persons interested in the decedent's 
|| estate." Utah Code Ann.S 75-3-105 (1978). 
{! The Supreme Court has recently considered whether a person 
II who was not an "interested person" could intervene in a probate 
i 
! 
j - 13 -
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proceeding. Matter of the Estate of Peterson, 716 P.2d 801 
(Utah 1986)• In Peterson, the Court stated: "When a statute 
creates a cause of action and designates those who may sue 
under it, none except those designated may sue." Peterson, 716 
P.2d at 803. Thus, the Court held that the party seeking to 
intervene in Peterson was precluded from doing so because that 
party did not come within the definition of "interested person" 
under the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803. 
Accordingly, the definition of "interested person" is 
crucial to determine whether a person has a right to 
participate in probate proceedings. An "interested person" is 
defined to include: 
heirs, devisees, children, spouses, creditors, 
beneficiaries, and others having a property right in 
or a claim against a trust estate or the estate of a 
decedent . . . . It also includes persons having 
priority for appointment as personal representative 
and other fiduciaries representing interested 
persons. The meaning as it relates to particular 
persons may vary from time to time and must be 
determined according to the particular purposes of, 
and matters involved in, any proceeding. 
Utah Code Ann.S 75-1-201(20) (1978). 
- 14 -
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B. Neither Kent nor Carol McLaughlin is an "Interested 
Person"; thus, the McLaughlins did not have Standing to Move 
the Probate Court for Affirmative Relief. 
Carol McLaughlin is the present wife of Kent McLaughlin, 
Diane's former husband. (R.168). As a result, Carol McLaughlin 
is not an "interested person." She does not come within any 
part of the definition. 
Kent McLaughlin is an interested person with regard to his 
claim against Diane's house for his $2,500.00 equitable 
interest. (R.55). However, the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
specifies that a person's status as an "interested person" can 
"vary from time to time and must be determined according to the 
particular purposes of . . . any proceeding." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-1-201(20) (1978). The purpose of the November 6, 1985 
hearing was to consider Mr. Perry's petition for approval of 
the sale of Diane's home to the Arnauds. (R.38-54, 62). Mr. 
McLaughlin's interest in that proceeding was limited to 
insuring that his equitable interest in Diane's home was fully 
paid. Kent McLaughlin had no interest with regard to the 
personal property items located in the home. Moreover, it was 
not necessary for him to bid on the home in order to protect 
his equitable interest. The proposed purchase price ($62,000) 
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was far in excess of Mr. McLaughlin's equitable lien 
(approximately $2,500), (Compare R.39 with R.384)e When the 
home was sold in December 1985 to the Arnauds, his equitable 
interest was fully paid. (R.241). Thus, Kent McLaughlin was 
not an "interested person" for purposes of bidding on Diane's 
home and furniture at the November 6, 1985 hearing. 
Finally, both Kent and Carol McLaughlin bid as joint 
purchasers. (R.78). Even if Kent McLaughlin were an 
"interested person" for purposes of bidding on Diane's home and 
furnishings, the court still permitted a non interested person 
(Carol McLaughlin) to intervene in the probate proceedings, to 
move the court for affirmative relief and the court granted 
affirmative relief to the non interested person. In doing so, 
the court exceeded its jurisdictional authority. 
C. The Repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3) in 1983 Removed 
the Probate Court's Authority to Permit a Person who is not an 
"Interested Person" to Bid for the Purchase of Estate Property. 
Prior to its repeal in 1983, Subsection 75-3-710(3) 
provided the sole exception to the rule that only "interested 
persons" may participate in probate proceedings. Utah Code 
Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 L. 1983, ch. 226, 
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§ 9). Subsection 75-3-710(3) provided that if the personal 
representative seeks approval of the sale of estate property, 
"any person may appear and bid for the property being sold . . 
J . ." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 — L. 
1983, ch. 226, § 9)(emphasis added). This subsection was not a 
part of the Uniform Probate Code. Compare, Uniform Probate 
Code § 3-710 with Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 
1983 -- L. 1983, ch. 226, § 9). 
The repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3) removed the only 
grounds for allowing non interested persons to participate in 
probate proceedings. A statement made by the Supreme Court in 
its recent decision in Peterson shows the importance of this 
repeal to the present case: 
(Claimant's) reliance on In Re Miles' Estate, 63 U. 
144, 223 P. 337 (1924), is misplaced. Comp. Laws Utah 
1917, § 7869 gave any person the right to be heard on 
any question affecting a probate matter. By 
I comparison only personal representatives or interested 
persons, as defined above, may petition for an order 
of complete settlement of the Estate. U.C.A., 1953, 
] § 75-3-1001(1) (1978 ed.). 
j Peterson, 716 P.2d at 802 - 803; emphasis in Supreme Court's 
| opinion. Similarly, Subsection 75-3-710(3) gave any person the 
right to bid on the sale of estate property at a hearing to 
approve the sale of the property. With its repeal in 1983, 
only interested persons have the right to move the probate 
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court for affirmative relief at hearings concerning petitions 
for the approval of the sale of real property, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-105 (1978). 
D. The Probate Court Is a Statutory Creation and Derives 
its Power Solely from the Statutes; Orders which Exceed its 
Statutory Authority are Void. 
Under the prior probate code, the Supreme Court has stated 
that the probate court's authority is entirely statutory. In 
Re Cloward's Estate, 82 P.2d 336, 339 (Utah 1938). In 
addition, the Supreme Court has stated that an order entered by 
the probate court without specific statutory authority was void 
and should be vacated, In Re Harris' Estate, 105 P.2d 461, 464 
(Utah 1940). The adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code has 
not vitiated the reasoning behind these cases. The probate 
court has limited jurisdictional powers and when it exceeds 
those powers, its order is void. 
II. IN THIS CASE, THE PROBATE COURT FAILED TO UNDERSTAND 
THE IMPORTANCE AND IMPACT OF THE REPEAL OF SUBSECTION 
75-3-710(3). 
- 18 -
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" A. While Most of Subsection 75-3-710(3) was Duplicative 
of Grants of Power Found elsewhere in the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code, the Power of Non Interested Persons to Bid on the Sale of 
Estate Property was Unique to Subsection 75-3-710(3). 
Normally, when a statute is repealed, the courts of that 
jurisdiction are immediately divested of all authority granted 
to them under the repealed statute. See, 73 Am. Jur. 2d 
Statutes § 385 (1974). However, the repeal of Subsection 
75-3-710(3) in 1983 created a problem in this regard because 
part of the powers granted pursuant to that subsection were 
also granted elsewhere in the probate code. The reason for 
this duplication was that when Utah adopted the Uniform Probate 
Code in 1977, the legislature added Subsection 75-3-710(3) 
which was not a part of the Uniform Probate Code. Compare 
§ 3-710 of the Uniform Probate Code with Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-710 (1978; repealed 1983 — L. 1983, ch. 226, § 9). 
When the legislature added Subsection 75-3-710(3) to the Utah 
version of the Uniform Probate Code, it duplicated grants of 
power which already were part of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
The problem with the probate court's decision in this case 
was that the probate court ruled as if Subsection 75-3-710(3) 
were entirely duplicative of other sections of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code. (R.163). A careful review of that subsection 
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with the other provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code 
shows that this is wrong. While parts of Subsection 
75-3-710(3) were duplicative, there was one part that not only 
was unique to Subsection 75-3-710(3) but was also contrary to 
the entire philosophy behind the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
Subsection 75-3-710(3) provided as follows: 
The personal representative may petition the court for 
an order approving any sale or other matter affecting 
any property of the estate which is made subject to 
court approval. After notice to all interested 
persons and the hearing, at which if the transaction 
is a sale, any person may appear and bid for the 
property being sold, the court shall enter such order 
as appears to be in the best interest of the estate. 
If a person interested in the estate bids for such 
property, he may request that his interest in the 
estate be offset against the purchase price. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 -- L. 1983, 
ch. 226, § 9). As will be shown, the first, third and 
(possibly) part of the second sentences are duplicative of 
grants of power in other sections of the Utah Uniform Probate 
Code; however, the remainder of the second sentence is unique 
to Subsection 75-3-710(3). 
The First Sentence 
Section 75-3-704 provides in part: "A personal 
representative . . . may invoke the jurisdiction of the court 
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in proceedings authorized by this code, to resolve questions 
concerning the estate or its administration." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-704 (1978). The Editorial Board Comment to this section 
of the Uniform Probate Code (§ 3-704) states: "This section is 
intended to confer authority on the personal representative to 
initiate a proceeding at any time when it is necessary to 
resolve a question relating to administration." Editorial 
Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-704 (1978). Thus, the 
personal representative already had the authority to seek court 
approval of actions with regard to estate property (including 
the approval of sales) without the addition of the first 
sentence of Subsection 75-3-710(3). 
The Third Sentence 
Similarly, Subsection 75-3-105(1) provides that any 
interested person "may petition the court for orders in formal 
proceedings . . . including, but not limited to those described 
in this chapter [Chapter 3 of Title 75, Probate of Wills and 
Administration]." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1978). Thus, 
if a personal representative sought approval of the sale of 
estate property to a third party, an interested person did not 
need the grant of authority in the last sentence of Subsection 
75-3-710(3) to petition the probate court for an order 
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requiring the property be sold to the interested person and 
requesting that the interested person's interest in the estate 
offset the purchase price. The interested person already had 
the authority to file that petition under Subsection 
75-3-105(1). Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1978). 
The Second Sentence 
However, the second sentence of Subsection 75-3-710(3) is a 
different situation. The general direction that the probate 
court view any petition regarding the sale of estate property 
from the perspective of "the best interests of the estate" was 
probably already implicit in the probate court's general grant 
of jurisdiction under Subsection 75-1-302(2). Compare Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983 -- L. 1983, ch. 
226, § 9) with Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978). But 
regardless of how this provision is interpreted, what really 
sets the second sentence apart from the rest of the Utah 
Uniform Probate Code is the provision that, when the personal 
representative files a petition for the approval of the sale of 
estate property, "anyone may appear and bid for the property 
being sold . . .." Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; 
repealed 1983 — L. 1983, ch. 226, § 9); emphasis added. This 
provision is not duplicative of any other grant of authority 
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under the Utah Uniform Probate Code. Rather, it is entirely 
contrary to the rest of the Code. See, I, A, B and C above; 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 (1978); Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803. 
As succinctly expressed in the Editorial Board Comments: 
This section (section 75-3-106) and others in Chapter 
3 describe a system of administration of decedents* 
estates which gives interested persons control of 
whether matter relating to estates will become 
occasions for judicial orders. 
Editorial Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106 (1978); 
emphasis added. As Peterson shows, a non interested person has 
no right to "control" what "matters . . . will become occasions 
for judicial orders." Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803. 
B. Unless Specific Statutory Authority is Provided to the 
Contrary, the Scope of Any Proceeding Before the Probate Court 
Depends upon the Prayer for Relief in the Petition before the 
Court. 
The Editorial Board Comment to Section 75-3-106 also 
establishes the scope of any proceeding before the probate 
court: 
Nothing except self interest will compel resort to the 
judge. When resort to the judge is necessary or 
desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain protection, 
the scope of the proceeding if not otherwise 
prescribed by the Code is framed by the petition. 
- 23 -
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Editorial Board Comment to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-106 (1978); 
emphasis added. Prior to its repeal, Subsection 75-3-710(3) 
provided the only exception to the Utah Uniform Probate Code's 
rule that only an "interested person" could seek affirmative 
relief from the probate court. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) 
(1978); Peterson, 716 P.2d at 803. Subsection 75-3-710(3) did 
this by "otherwise providing" that the "scope" of a proceeding 
on a personal representative's petition for approval of the 
sale of estate property would be enlarged to permit "any person 
(to) appear" and seek affirmative relief from the court (an 
order requiring the personal representative to sell the estate 
property to the non interested person). But when Subsection 
75-3-710(3) was repealed in 1983, the "scope" of the proceeding 
was again restricted to how the personal representative framed 
the prayer for relief. 
In the present case, Mr. Perry prayed that the Court enter 
an order approving the sale of the estate's property to the 
Arnauds. (R.42-43). Thus, the scope of the proceeding was 
limited to determining whether that prayer should be granted. 
The probate court did not have the authority to entertain the 
motion of a non interested party and to grant affirmative 
relief to that party. 
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C. The Probate Court Misconstrued the Consequence of 
Holding that the December 3/ 1985 Order was Void. 
The probate court's failure to appreciate the significance 
of the second sentence of Subsection 75-3-710(3) caused the 
court to erroneously rule that the court could continue to 
entertain bids from non interested persons notwithstanding the 
repeal of Subsection 75-3-710(3). Moreover, the court totally 
misconstrued the consequences that would result from a contrary 
holding (that the repeal of this subsection limited the probate 
court's authority over petitions for the approval of the sale 
of real property): 
When the personal representative comes to Court 
intentionally, or mistakenly under the statute, and 
says, Judge, approve this sale for this third party, 
you're seeking approval of the Court. . . . And I'm 
telling you right now that as far as this Court's 
concerned, and I suspect many of my colleagues would 
feel the same way, and this is a matter I'll take up 
in the Judges* meeting Wednesday next, that if a 
personal representative seeks the approval, and all 
the protections that run with it from this Court on a 
sale of real, or personal, or any other kind of 
property, and comes in with the proposition that 
inquiry as to whether or not this is a good thing for 
the estate. Don't find out whether there is something 
that has more money to offer, whether or not it's a 
good bargain or not. Then be advised that I will 
never approve any personal representative sale of any 
property under any circumstances, if those are the 
limitations that are imposed upon me as a probate 
judge. 
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Judge Hanson's comments, Transcript of April 7th hearing 
(R.362-363). ; 
Contrary to Judge Hanson's comments, the repeal of 1 
Subsection 75-3-710(3) does not prevent the probate court from 
inquiring into the substance of the personal representative's | 
petition for approval. Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978). 
The probate court can inquire as to whether anyone is willing 
to offer a better price for the property. If a non interested 
party offers a better price, the probate court should consider 
that offer in determining whether to grant or deny the personal 
representative's petition. Moreover, an interested person I 
could actually bid for the property, and the court could ; 
require the personal representative to sell the property to ; 
that person. Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105(1) (1978). The only \ 
limitation on the court, after the repeal of Subsection 
75-3-710(3), is that the court is without authority to both 
deny the personal representative's petition and require the 
personal representative to sell the estate's property to a non 
interested party. Otherwise, the court continues to have full 
power to investigate the personal representative's petition and 
deny it if the court determines that it is not in the best 
l 
interest of the estate. 
| 
i 
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III. MR. PERRY IS ENTITLED TO AN ORDER VACATING THE 
DECEMBER 3, 1985 ORDER NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT MR. PERRY 
FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE PROCEDURE FOLLOWED BY THE COURT AT THE 
TIME THE HEARING WAS HELD. 
When the petition of Mr. Perry for approval of the sale of 
Diane's home to the Arnauds was called on November 6, 1985 and 
Kent and Carol McLaughlin made their bids for the property, Mr. 
Perry did not raise any objection on the basis that the 
McLaughlins were not interested persons. (R.369-386). In 
addition, Mr. Perry participated in the drafting of the 
December 3, 1985 Order. (R.66-82). Judge Hanson weighed the 
equities between the parties and held that Mr. Perry waived any 
jurisdictional defect because he failed to object at the time 
of the November 6, 1985 Order or when the Order was executed. 
(R.162-164).l 
This is an erroneous view of the law. Parties to a lawsuit 
cannot consent to grant a court subject matter jurisdiction it 
Counsel for Mr. Perry filed an affidavit with the court in 
which he averred that he advised Judge Hanson of the repeal of 
U.C.A. § 75-3-710(3) prior to the entry of the December 3, 1985 
Order. (R.240). 
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does not have. Werner v. Ill, Cent. R.R., 379 111. 559, 42 
N.E.2d 82 (1942); see also, 28 U.S.C.A.§ 1359 ("A [federal] 
district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in 
which any party . . . has been . . . collusively . . . joined 
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.") It follows, a_ 
fortiori, that one party's failure to object can never grant 
subject matter jurisdiction to a court that the court otherwise 
would not have. Indeed, 
Even the party which [sought and] obtained the void 
judgment may collaterally attack it. . . . 
A party attacking a judgment as void need show no 
meritorious claim or defense or other equities on his 
behalf; he is entitled to have the judgment treated 
for what it is, a legal nullity, but he must establish 
that the judgment is void. 
7 J. Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice 1f 60.25(2) 
(2d. ed. 1985) (interpreting F.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(4) — 
identical to U.R.C.P. Rule 60(b)(5)) (emphasis added). 
Thus, Mr. Perry's failure to raise the objection of lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear the motion of Kent and 
Carol McLaughlin cannot waive the subject matter jurisdictional 
defect. Since the December 3, 1985 Order was entered pursuant 
to the motion of non interested persons and since the court's 
jurisdiction is limited to hearing the motions of interested 
persons, the order entered is void. The order is a legal 
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nullity and Mr. Perry is entitled to have it vacated. 7 J. 
Moore and J. Lucas, Moore's Federal Practice If 60.25(2) (2d. 
ed. 1985). 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Perry respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
probate court's decision and remand the case to the probate 
court with directions to enter an order vacating the December 
3, 1985 Order. 
Dated this ^ day of December, 1986 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
Charles M. Bennett 
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry 
Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Diane Laura 
McLaughlin 
CDN4402B 
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FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County, Utah 
DEC -3 1995 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
W. Waldan Lloyd (A1985) 
Charles M. Bennett (A0283) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry. 
Personal Representative 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
[In the Matter of the Estate Of ) ORDER GRANTING SALE OF 
DIANE LAURA MCLAUGHLIN. ) REAL PROPERTY 
I ) 
j Deceased. ' ) Probate No. P-85-893 
* * * * * * * 
Hearing on the Petition for Approval of Sale of Home and 
Sale of Furnishings filed by Eugene L. Perry, personal 
Representative, on October 15. 1985. came on for hearing before 
i 
the above entitled Court, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson. 
Probate Judge, on November 6. 1985. pursuant to notice. 
[petitioner was represented by his attorney. Charles M. Bennett, 
• i 
i « 
of the firm of Callister. Duncan & Nebeker; the former spouse 
of the decedent and his spouse, Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin, 
were present in person and represented by their attorney. E.H. 
Fankhauser; and the Court, after review of the offer to 
purchase the real property located at 902 East 8530 South. 
H Du^2 Hintfey. Cferifferd CM St. Coui Court 
t t / 
Deputy Clerk 
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Sandy, Utah, submitted with the Petition of the Personal 
Representative, called for higher and better bids; and Kent G. 
and Carol McLaughlin, having submitted to the Court their offer 
to purchase the real property and the furnishings which offer 
was considered by the Court and compared with the offer 
submitted with the Petition of the Personal Representative; and 
the Court having made inquiry and having made comparison of the 
offer submitted, being duly advised in the premises determined 
that the offer of Kent G. and Carol McLaughlin is a better 
offer than the offer submitted by the Personal Representative, 
pursuant to Petition; how. therefore. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin 
to purchase the real property located at 902 East 8530 South. 
Sandy. Utah, pursuant to Earnest Money Sales Agreement dated 
October 30. 1985 is approved and accepted by the Court. 
2. The offer of Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin 
to purchase personal property consisting of furniture and 
furnishings as set forth in the Schedule of Personal property 
-31-
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on file herein, be and the same is hereby approved and accepted 
by the Court. 
3. Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin 
the personal Representative the offered purchase 
$63,000.00 for the real property described as. 
All of Lot 305, FAIR OAKS NO. 3 SUBDIVISION 
according to the official Plat on file in 
the office of the Salt Lake County Recorder, 
State of Utah 
as follows: • • ' 
(a) $500.00 which represents the Earnest Money 
deposit; 
(b) $18,500.00 representing the approximate balance 
of an existing mortgage to be assumed by the Buyer; 
(c) $2,561.61 representing the approximate balance of 
Buyer's equity due to the buyer under a Decree of Divorce of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah; 
(this sum to be determined exactly and adjusted at the time of 
closing, pursuant to agreement dated January 10, 1984); 
are to pay to 
price of 
-32 -
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(d) $41,438.33 representing the approximate balance 
to be paid on closing on or before December 1, 1985 from loan 
proceeds to be obtained by the Buyers. 
As a part of the offer of Buyers, approved by the Court, Buyers 
agree to be responsible to pay all financing costs and the cost 
of a Title Insurance Policy, should a policy of insurance be 
requested and issue. 
4. Buyers are to pay to the Personal Representative, on 
or before December 1, 1985, in cash, the sum of $1,100.00 
representing the purchase price for the personal property 
(household furnishings). 
5. The equitable interest in and to the real property of 
the Buyer, Kent G. McLaughlin, is to be determined exactly and 
adjusted as to the amount at the time of closing. 
6. In the event the Buyers, Kent G. McLaughlin and Carol 
McLaughlin, and Seller, Eugene Perry as Personal 
Representative, are unable to agree to the amount of Mr. 
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McLaughlin's lien against the home (paragraph 3(c) above), 
further hearing on the lien issue is hereby reserved by the 
Court. / 
Da ted t h i s S day of h^&wf&X1— 1985 
CDN6248M 
'IMOTHY "ST. HANSON. 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H.DW0NHWOL1Y 
By Deputy Clerx 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ORDER GRANTING SALE OF REAL PROPERTY and MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDER were mailed, postage fully prepaid this 
27th day of November. 1985, to the following: 
E. H. Fankhauser 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84111 
Ju^Z^ >y£ 
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E. H. FANKHAUSER 
Attorney for McLaughlins 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 534-1148 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ORDER DENYING PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S AMENDED 
PETITION TO AMEND ORDER 
Probate No. . P 85-893 
Judge Hanson 
Hearing on the Personal Representative's Amended Petition 
to Amend Order Granting Sale of Real Property came on for hearing 
at a regular term of the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, 
Monday, February 10, 1986 before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson, 
District Judge. The Personal Representative was represented by 
his attorney, Charles M. Bennett. Kent and Carol McLaughlin were 
present in Court in person and represented by their attorney, 
E. H. Fankhauser. The matter was argued and submitted to the 
Court for its determination and decision; and the Court, having 
taken the matter under advisement, reviewed the file, considered 
the arguments of counsel and having rendered its Memorandum 
Decision herein, and being otherwise fully advised; enters the 
following: 
_36- 000190 
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H. Dixon Hindley. Clerk 3rd Oist. Court 
) 
In the matter of the Estate Of . 
DIANE LAURA McLAUGHLIN, . 
Deceased. . 
) 
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Personal 
Representatives Amended Petition to Amend Order Granting Sale 
of Real Property dated December 3, 1985, pursuant to Rule 6OB 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, be and the same is hereby 
denied in accordance with the Memorandum Decision of this Court. 
The oral Motion of the Personal Representative to 
enter an Order, should the Court disallow the relief requested, 
in conformance with Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and to certify this matter under Rule 54(b) Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, be and the same is hereby denied in accordance with 
the Memorandum Decision of this Court, without prejudice to the 
Personal Representative to seek such an Order from the current 
Probate Judge, should the Personal Representative chose to do so, 
DONE IN OPEN COURT this / " 2 ^ da/of March, 1986. 
[Horary riANSOU 
)ISTRICT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H.DW0NHtt40LEY 
/-Mark 
&*»tfy CJ%'V 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed to Charles M. Bennett, Attorney for Personal Representative, 
in accordance with Rule 2.9 of Rules of Practice, addressed to 
him at Suite 800, Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
postage prepaid, on 
this
 Y^~~ day ° f i , i a r c h» i 9 8 6 « 
cuu^< 
-38- 000 
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CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER 
CHARLES M._ BENNETT (A0283) 
Suite 800 - Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 
Telephone: (801) 530-7300 
Attorneys for Eugene L. Perry, 
Personal Representative 
% E D IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
J U L - 91986 
H.DixopHindley.ue 
/ £ • . / / / (i\'% 
iK 3rd Diet. Coort 
Deputy ClerK' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF 
DIANE LAURA MCLAUGHLIN, 
Deceased 
ORDER DENYING PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE'S RULE 
RULE 59(a) PETITION 
EXCEPT AS TO RULE 54(b) 
CERTIFICATION 
Probate No. P - 85 - 893 
* * * * * * * 
The Petition of the Personal Representative to amend the 
. Court Order of March 12, 1986, pursuant to U.R.C.P. Rule 59(a) 
came before the above entitled Court, pursuant to notice, on 
April 7, 1986, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding. The 
Personal Representative was represented by his attorney, 
i Charles M. Bennett. Kent McLaughlin and Carol McLaughlin 
appeared in person and were represented by their attorney, E. 
H. Fankhauser. The Court heard the arguments of counsel, 
reviewed the memoranda and affidavits submitted by the 
respective parties, and otherwise was fully advised in the 
premises. As a result, the Court determined that the Court's 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
:
^ 
Order of March 12, 1986 was proper. The Court turther 
determined that there is no just cause for delaying the 
finality of the March 12, 1986 Order, that the elements of the 
Pate v. Marathon Steel case have been met by the Personal 
Representative's Rule 54(b) Motion and that the Court's March 
12, 1986 Order should be supplemented accordingly. Now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Rule 54(b) Petition of the 
Personal Representative be and the same is hereby granted and 
the March 12, 1986 Order is hereby certified as a final order 
under Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, except for the Rule 54(b) 
certification, the Rule 59(a) Petition of the Personal 
Representative be and the same is hereby denied 
/ day-of t^yjLusU Dated this , 1986. 
'iWOTfi? R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
A — 
CDN3743B > • 
= % 
By — ^ V ^ £ ^ 2 ^ ^ < g g ^ ^ - ^ 
l~* J 
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Exhibit No. 4 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-201(20) (1978) 
75-1-201. General Definitions — . . . 
(20) "Interested person" includes heirs, devisees, 
children, spouses, creditors, beneficiaries, and any others 
having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or 
the estate of a decedent, ward, or protected person which may 
be affected by the proceeding. It also includes persons having 
priority for appointment as personal representative and other 
fiduciaries representing interested persons. The meaning as it 
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and 
must be determined according to the particular purposes of, and 
matters involved in, any proceeding. 
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Exhibit No. 5 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-1-302(2) (1978) 
75-1-302. Subject Matter Jurisdiction -- . . . 
(2) The court has full power to make orders, judgments, 
and decrees and take all other action necessary and proper to 
administer justice in the matters which come before it. 
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Exhibit No. 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-105 (1978) 
75-3-105. Proceedings affecting devolution and 
administration—Jurisdiction of subject matter. -- (1) Persons 
interested in decedents' estates may apply to the registrar for 
determination in the informal proceedings provided in this 
chapter and may petition the court for orders in formal 
proceedings within the court's jurisdiction, including, but not 
limited to those described in this chapter. The court may hear 
and determine formal proceedings involving administration and 
distribution of decedent's estates after notice to interested 
persons in conformity with section 75-1-401. Persons notified 
are bound though less than all interested persons may have been 
given notice. 
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Exhibit No. 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-704 (1978) 
75-3-704. Personal representative to proceed without court 
order—Exception. -- A personal representative shall proceed 
expeditiously with the settlement and distribution of a 
decedent's estate and, except as otherwise specified or ordered 
in regard to a supervised personal representative or in regard 
to a restriction placed on the disposition of real property 
under subsection 75-3-710 (2), do so without adjudication, 
order, or direction of the court, but he may invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court in proceedings authorized by this 
code, to resolve questions concerning the estate or its 
administration. 
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Exhibit No. 8 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-710(3) (1978; repealed 1983) 
75-3-710. Powers of personal representatives--In 
general—Exceptions—Hearings. -- . . . 
(3) The personal representative may petition the court for 
an order approving any sale or other matter affecting any 
property of the estate which is made subject to court 
approval. After notice to all interested persons and the 
hearing, at which if the transaction is a sale, any person may 
appear and bid for the property being sold, the court shall 
enter such order as appears to be in the best interests of the 
estate. If a person interested in the estate bids for such 
property, he may request that his interest in the estate be 
offset against the purchase price. 
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Exhibit No. 9 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1983) 
Rule 60. Relief From Judgment or Order. . . . 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) 
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) 
newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have 
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse 
party; (4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has 
not been personally served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in said 
action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has been 
satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon 
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it 
is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be 
made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or 
(4), not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or 
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this 
subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a 
court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside a judgment 
for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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Exhibit No. 10 
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1985) 
Rule 60. Relief from Judgment or Order . . . 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; Excusable Neglect; Newly 
Discovered Evidence; Fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms 
as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal 
representatiave from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for 
the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due 
diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or 
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, 
or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or 
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 
judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for 
reasons, (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion 
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit 
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to 
relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to 
grant relief to a defendant not actually personally notified as 
provided in Title 28, U.S.C., § 1655, or to set aside a 
judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram 
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the 
nature of a bill of review, are abolished, and the procedure 
for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as 
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action. 
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Exhibit No. 11 
Editorial Board Comment to LLC.A. §75-3-106 
This section and others in Chapter 3 describe a system of 
administration of decedents' estates which gives interested 
persons control of whether matters relating to estates will 
become occasions for judicial orders. Sections 75-3-501 
through 75-3-505 describe supervised administration, a judicial 
proceeding which is continuous throughout administration. It 
corresponds with the theory of administration of decedents' 
estates which prevails in may states. See, section 62, Model 
Probate Code. If supervised administration is not requested, 
persons interested in an estate may use combinations of the 
formal proceedings (order by judge after notice to persons 
concerned with the relief sought), informal proceedings 
(request for the limited response that nonjudicial personnel of 
the probate court are authorized to make in response to 
verified application) and filings provided in the remaining 
parts of Chapter 3 to secure authority and protection needed to 
administer the estate. Nothing except self-interest will 
compel resort to the judge. When resort to the judge is 
necessary or desirable to resolve a dispute or to gain 
protection, the scope of the proceeding if not otherwise 
prescribed by the Code is framed by the petition. The securing 
of necessary jurisdiction over interested persons in a formal 
proceeding is facilitated by sections 75-3-105 and 75-3-602. 
Section 75-3-201 locates venue for all proceedings at the place 
where the first proceeding occurred. 
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Exhibit No. 12 
Editorial Board Comment to U.C.A. §75-3-704 
This section is intended to confer authority on the 
personal representative to initiate a proceeding at any time 
when it is necessary to resolve a question relating to 
administration. Section 75-3-105 grants broad subject matter 
jurisdiction to the probate court which covers a proceeding 
initiated for any purpose other than those covered by more 
explicit provisions dealing with testacy proceedings, 
proceedings for supervised administration, proceedings 
concerning disputed claims and proceedings to close estates. 
(The Utah version omits section 3-705 of the official text 
pertaining to the duty of a personal representative to give 
information of his appointment to heirs and devisees.) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four (4) true and correct copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANT'S BRIEF were mailed, postage fully 
prepaid this £-3r<?/day of December, 1986, to the following: 
E. H. Fankhauser 
660 South 200 East 
Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
%X 
CDN4483B 
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